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 Britain’s ‘civilising project’: community cohesion and core values 
Multiculturalism in Britain is under attack. At the beginning of the new year, Gordon Brown 
took the opportunity to reinvigorate a national debate on multiculturalism as a source of 
internal tension and divisions. And in what has now become a familiar mantra, he claimed 
that:  
Continually failing to emphasise what bound us together as a country, 
multiculturalism became an excuse for justifying separateness and then separateness 
became a tolerance of – and all too often a defence of – even greater exclusivity. 
(cited in Johnston, 2007)  
The Chancellor of the Exchequer is not alone in this view, and a wideranging coalition of 
think-tanks, journalists and scholars have reiterated the perception that diversity threatens 
national stability (see, for example, West, 2005). Perhaps most tellingly, this view has 
underpinned a form of hegemony through which the main political parties in the country have 
formed a consensus. Only weeks after Gordon Brown reiterated his views, the Leader of the 
Opposition, David Cameron, (2007) produced what was nearly a carbon copy of his 
comments and maintained that ‘[t]he doctrine of multiculturalism has undermined our 
nation’s sense of cohesiveness because it emphasises what divides us rather than what brings 
us together’. As Sivanandan (2006a: 3) has acutely noted, multiculturalism ‘has become the 
whipping boy’.  
This attack on multiculturalism has its roots in the series of urban disorders that occurred in 
northern towns and cities in 2001. Throughout that summer bitter fighting occurred, most 
visibly in Oldham, Bradford and Burnley, predominantly between white and Asian youths, 
and the police (see Home Office, 2001). In response, a wide-ranging official investigation led 
by civil servant Ted Cantle (the Cantle Report) claimed that the violence was indicative of a 
nation of communities leading ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001: para 2.1). In turn, this ‘reading’ 
of the disorders – which downplayed the role of far-Right activity in stoking the violence – 
suggested that it was necessary to instil a set of core values among citizens in order to foster 
unity. ‘It is necessary’, Cantle suggested, ‘to establish a greater sense of citizenship, based on 
(a few) common principles which are shared and observed by all members of the community’ 
(Cantle, 2001: para 2.13).  
Since its publication the Cantle Report has become the blueprint for a formal shift in race 
relations policy and practice (see Burnett, 2004). In policy terms, multiculturalism has begun 
to be replaced by a community cohesion agenda that sets out to define the boundaries of 
diversity and, as such, has given political impetus to the attack on multiculturalism. At the 
heart of this movement is a desire to instil codes of behaviour among citizens, and indeed 
would-be citizens, and redefine a sense of national identity. Consequently, citizenship tests 
and swearing allegiance to the Queen and nation are now compulsory for those who wish to 
gain citizenship in the country,1 and the aims of citizenship education and the teaching of 
‘Britishness’ in schools has become the source of national debate (see, for example Garner, 
2007: 25).  
At the heart of such attempts to instil core values among those who reside, or wish to reside, 
in Britain is a distorted resurrection of discredited underclass theories; in other words, 
policies, politics and, to a certain extent, social contexts are downplayed in favour of a theory 
that seeks to describe a range of conflicts and tensions through a perception of the lack of 
core values. This is particularly visible in the context of the ‘war on terror’ (see Burnett, 
2005), which, if not framed by the belief in a ‘clash of civilisations’ is framed by the belief of 
a ‘clash about civilisation’ (Blair, 2006) that sets out the framing of core values as a way in 
which to establish stability and unity. One of the consequences of this is that in a context 
where the very role of Britain in global affairs is of central concern – not least through the 
actions of the country in the deeply unpopular ‘war on terror’ – ‘Britishness’ has been 
manifested as a banner around which to foster core values at home. Gordon Brown made this 
clear in a debate in the New Labour think-tank, the Fabian Society, in 2005, and claimed that 
‘the days of Britain having to apologise for the British Empire are over. We should celebrate’ 
(cited in Pilger, 2006: 6).3  
As the Institute of Race Relations has powerfully maintained, this shift to community 
cohesion should consequently be understood as a move to cultural homogenisation (see 
Campaign Against Racism and Fascism, 2002; and Fekete, 2004). Moreover, this 
homogenisation is enforced (Sivanandan, 2006b). Where the community cohesion agenda 
attempts to instil values in individuals and communities it is supported by increasing criminal 
justice and anti-terrorism powers, which, crucially, extend to the ‘policing’ of citizenship and 
belonging. Thus, for example, in 2005 new powers to deport non-UK citizens were 
consolidated through a particularly vague notion of their presence as being ‘not conducive to 
the public good’. Examples of this included those who were decided to be threatening to the 
‘UK’s good relations with a third country’, public speaking and using a position of 
responsibility, such as that of a teacher (Home Office, 2005:1–3). In this vein, in 2006 Tony 
Blair bluntly told Muslims that ‘Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. 
Conform to it; or don’t come here’ (cited in Woodward, 2006). ‘The path to the authoritarian 
state’ as Waters (2004: 2) has suggested, ‘leads through the security gates’.  
What is being witnessed, then, is something akin to a civilisational project, which aims to 
instil values among those who are deemed to be a threat, or potential threat, to a given 
definition of community cohesion. Yet this agenda cannot be separated from the wider 
context in which it has been invigorated. Nor can it be separated from the directly coercive 
actions from which it maintains support. For it is through these wider contexts that 
community cohesion can be understood as a euphemism for integration; and integration a 
euphemism for assimilation. As such, while assimilation suggests a form of ‘hyper-inclusion’ 
of certain forms of diversity, it also tells us equally about the forms of diversity that will not 
be recognised or accepted.  
In this context, a velvet glove and iron fist analogy is particularly appropriate in that the 
policies of integration pursued by the New Labour government are supported by increasing 
scope for coercion. Where community cohesion is utilised to justify an increasing battery of 
anti-terrorism and criminal justice powers, it also works to justify an increasingly tough 
immigration and asylum system that bases people’s eligibility on their potential to contribute 
economically. On the one hand, the introduction of a pointsbased, managed migration system 
explicitly decides whether people can enter Britain based on their economic worth (Home 
Office, 2006). On the other, a range of policy reforms from the withdrawal of provision for 
ESOL (English as a Second Language) classes (see Burnett, 2006) to the dramatic cutting of 
legal assistance for those seeking asylum (see Bail for Immigration Detainees and Asylum 
Aid, 2005), works to make clear that a given understanding of community cohesion seeks to 
prevent integration, as much as enforcing it.  
Ultimately, the community cohesion agenda can be assessed against the form of cohesion that 
it works to foster. The policy reforms that, apparently, purvey necessary ‘core values’ at the 
same time as multiculturalism is blamed for their demise, include the introduction of control 
orders and a shoot-to-kill policy for suspected terrorists. They also include a managed 
migration system articulating an understanding of community cohesion based on market 
dictates, which, as Liz Fekete (2001: 29) has stated, ‘allows the rich First World to maintain 
its economic dominance by emptying the poorer worlds of their skilled workforces’. And 
they include the end point of an asylum system that enforces destitution on people 
reminiscent, as Christine Majid (cited in Waites, 2007) has made clear, of ‘the days of the 
19th century poor laws’.  
As Tony Bunyan, the Director of Statewatch, has said (2005, Introduction), if such measures 
are representative of the core values that are expected to be adhered to in order to protect ‘our 
way of life’, then ‘I, together with many others, say “Not in my name”’.  
Notes 1 Jon Burnett is currently finishing a PhD on community cohesion at the Centre for 
Criminal Justice Studies, University of Leeds.  
2 The first citizenship ceremony was held on 26 February 2004 (see Home Office, 2004). The 
pledge reads ‘I, (name), (swear by almighty God)/(do solemnly and sincerely affirm) that, on 
becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen 
Elizabeth II, her heirs and successors according to law. I will give my loyalty to the United 
Kingdom and respect its rights and freedoms. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfil my 
duties and obligations as a British citizen’ (see Travis, 2003).  
3 As Paul Gilroy wryly responded: ‘When did we start apologising?’ (Fabian Society, 2006).  
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